the word on the street is that Johnny will have a Provost at each pit with hookers and blow... oh wait...thats an exageration.... really only at the driver changes
No Comment ... lol I do like the sounds of it ...
Badassmav Baja 1000 updates ?
- Thread starter Johnny
- Start date
No Comment ... lol I do like the sounds of it ...
What, a 4th driver? Be sure to bring enough tampons so you ladies don't run out Lol! If you leave me your sat phone number, I'll call you from La Paz and take those rooms off of your hands for ya.
I'm surprised that you are traveling so light as far as on board tools and xtra parts are concerned. Really? Not even a roll of duct tape, or bag of zip ties? I know you just didn't mention those small things. The spare parts/onboard tool package we tote in Baja is in excess of 300 pounds. Clutches, axles, electrical components, shovels, ramps, I could go on forever, as I am certain our car will with all that crap on board.
Our #1 strategy is already in motion. Pre run, prerun, prerun. Then, logistics x 3 as well. Marc is drawing up a comprehensive chase vehicle guide that is loosely based on a format that worked well for him when he raced for team green. It is a guide book that is one up on what BFG pits uses. There will be no lost or late crew members during this race. I will add here that we always have at least 1 Spanish speaking local riding in each chase vehicle, and a butt load of Monster and team paraphernalia , as to bribe our way past the scammers.
We'll stop closer to 11 times, have 3 chase vehicles bunny hopping Marc's position on the track, and 1 or 2 crews will be down deep a day prior in hotel rooms living it up. I'll be driving chase one, always at his side (mostly) and towing one of our stock mavericks as a rolling junkyard of sorts.
Marc said that if you don't already have a commitment to sat phones, he can get you a great deal on Iridium Go's. They pair up with your smart phone, and have endless possibilities. I could tell you of some of them, but that is your preference if you adapt that technology. Let me know. Are you going to have clean restrooms to powder your noses at each pit? Wouldn't want you ladies to get too dirty out there!!!Just remember if you are in the fortunate position to see our tail lights as La Paz is near, that the man driving in the green booger is going on 35 hours w/out sleep. I'll tell him to go easy on you.
Yes I already committed on the two rental phones and already own two and the Bgan Unit the bgan downloads 20 times faster then the Iridium Go and thanks for the hookup offer, If the Bgan does work as advertised Im going to buy the auto Tracking Unit and Mount it on chase 1 for future ass kicking sessions .. as for the 4th driver I have a game plan and im sticking to it lol Fresh Drivers have to be faster then somebody that just raced 24hours none stop .. Marc will be hallucinating, calling you saying Johnny This Johnny that and ill be at the Finish Line Consuming your Favorite Malted Beverage's
I do have Prerun File and Notes coming from a friend ..
Yes Thanks for the Tip on the Keys we will have multiple sets as well as a 3rd key in the other trucks
Brian B
Red Rotax - UTVUnderground Approved
What kind of drugs does this require?
facteryfmf
Looking For a Few Good Men - UTVUnderground Approv
Molly.
facteryfmf
Looking For a Few Good Men - UTVUnderground Approv
That is not comparable. A 60 mph average means it will take BJ 20 hours. Marc will take 39+ hours.
I believe BJ was supposed to have a relief driver part way through but he didnt show up. If Marc can go that long with out getting mentally fatigued I would be shocked but he is experienced so that will help. I would still have a backup just in case.
Kalop
XP900
It was not a comparison, just asking to get feel for how many do it solo.
Not many, Ironman Bike numbers are less than ten, Looks like Tavo and BJ in the trucks.
badassmav
Well-Known Member
I don't know. Ask Ivan, he's done it for years at 50+, but I don't recall ever reading or hearing negative comments toward his abilities, or accomplishments. For Marc, good old fashioned testosterone, and a strong will to be better than the competition. A tireless desire that never gives in. Will he be tired at 400 miles? A little. Will he be exhausted at 800 miles? Probably will start setting in. At 1000 miles? Exhausted for sure, and if there are any cars in sight after 1200 miles, I can say with a good degree of certainty that his awareness of that fact will overcome fatigue, as he heads into the final stages of a long anticipated and sought after UTV championship.
Sarcasm put aside, the real response to your question is none. I've known Marc since birth. He doesn't use drugs. Never has. A finish line celebration drink would be the first time all year that I would see him even drink alcohol, if he did at all.
I don't know why people have such a difficult time accepting the fact that he is the real deal. You all will have your shot at beating him down on the race course, during the 1000. And if he wins, either put up your 500 bones within 1 hour of the finish of the event, and protest us for whatever cheating you think it is that we do. OR, just accept the fact that you got beat by a better driver and be a good sportsman about it.
Look, Marc's been successfully doing this for over 25 years. For someone in the 1900 class to think they can out drive him in Mexico, or anywhere else for that matter, with their 10 years experience in a 4 wheeled vehicle, or 15 years on a bike, or what ever it is that they bring to the table, is just plain stupid. He's been winning races and championships since he was 10! How else could he beating the competition all year long in a slug that weighs 2,300 lbs. dry with a bone stock motor, a knucklehead like myself as his mechanic, and less than 100 miles per tank of gas?
I talk shit because, well, I talk shit. It gets attention, and entertains at the same time. I've earned the right to brag. We are leading the points by a fair margin going into this race. I worked countless hours to be sure that the car is as ready as Marc is. We don't just wash it off, weld a crack or two, and race it again next month. The car is maintained, and built, like a truck. There is little luck, if any, in being prepared, and in Mexico, NO-ONE currently racing in our class will be nearly as prepared as Marc will be. I'm confident the results of the race will expose that fact.
badassmav
Well-Known Member
35 hrs
badassmav
Well-Known Member
Look at the can of worms you opened up Johnny. It's like a volatile recipe... Start a new thread, put a dash of this, or that in, then, add some BAMoh man Reid that sucks that its going to take you 39+ Hours Im going to do it in 30 hours and 48 Minutes ..
, and watch the pot boil over!and in 1974 We where going thru the Fuel Crisis so they did not have a Race
1974
NO RACE—FUEL CRISIS
Oil Embargo, 1973–1974
During the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, Arab members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) imposed an embargo against the United States in retaliation for the U.S. decision to re-supply the Israeli military and to gain leverage in the post-war peace negotiations. Arab OPEC members also extended the embargo to other countries that supported Israel including the Netherlands, Portugal, and South Africa. The embargo both banned petroleum exports to the targeted nations and introduced cuts in oil production. Several years of negotiations between oil-producing nations and oil companies had already destabilized a decades-old pricing system, which exacerbated the embargo’s effects.
Cars wait in long lines during the gas shortage. (Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division, U.S. News & World Report Magazine Photograph Collection, Warren K. Leffler)
cars wait in long lines during the gas shortage. (Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division, U.S. News & World Report Magazine Photograph Collection, Warren K. Leffler)
The 1973 Oil Embargo acutely strained a U.S. economy that had grown increasingly dependent on foreign oil. The efforts of President Richard M. Nixon’s administration to end the embargo signaled a complex shift in the global financial balance of power to oil-producing states and triggered a slew of U.S. attempts to address the foreign policy challenges emanating from long-term dependence on foreign oil.
By 1973, OPEC had demanded that foreign oil corporations increase prices and cede greater shares of revenue to their local subsidiaries. In April, the Nixon administration announced a new energy strategy to boost domestic production to reduce U.S. vulnerability to oil imports and ease the strain of nationwide fuel shortages. That vulnerability would become overtly clear in the fall of that year.
The onset of the embargo contributed to an upward spiral in oil prices with global implications. The price of oil per barrel first doubled, then quadrupled, imposing skyrocketing costs on consumers and structural challenges to the stability of whole national economies. Since the embargo coincided with a devaluation of the dollar, a global recession seemed imminent. U.S. allies in Europe and Japan had stockpiled oil supplies, and thereby secured for themselves a short-term cushion, but the long-term possibility of high oil prices and recession precipitated a rift within the Atlantic Alliance. European nations and Japan found themselves in the uncomfortable position of needing U.S. assistance to secure energy sources, even as they sought to disassociate themselves from U.S. Middle East policy. The United States, which faced a growing dependence on oil consumption and dwindling domestic reserves, found itself more reliant on imported oil than ever before, having to negotiate an end to the embargo under harsh domestic economic circumstances that served to diminish its international leverage. To complicate matters, the embargo’s organizers linked its end to successful U.S. efforts to bring about peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors.
Partly in response to these developments, on November 7 the Nixon administration announced Project Independence to promote domestic energy independence. It also engaged in intensive diplomatic efforts among its allies, promoting a consumers’ union that would provide strategic depth and a consumers’ cartel to control oil pricing. Both of these efforts were only partially successful.
President Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger recognized the constraints inherent in peace talks to end the war that were coupled with negotiations with Arab OPEC members to end the embargo and increase production. But they also recognized the linkage between the issues in the minds of Arab leaders. The Nixon administration began parallel negotiations with key oil producers to end the embargo, and with Egypt, Syria, and Israel to arrange an Israeli pullout from the Sinai and the Golan Heights. Initial discussions between Kissinger and Arab leaders began in November 1973 and culminated with the First Egyptian-Israeli Disengagement Agreement on January 18, 1974. Though a finalized peace deal failed to materialize, the prospect of a negotiated end to hostilities between Israel and Syria proved sufficient to convince the relevant parties to lift the embargo in March 1974.
The embargo laid bare one of the foremost challenges confronting U.S. policy in the Middle East, that of balancing the contradictory demands of unflinching support for Israel and the preservation of close ties to the Arab oil-producing monarchies. The strains on U.S. bilateral relations with Saudi Arabia revealed the difficulty of reconciling those demands. The U.S. response to the events of 1973–1974 also clarified the need to reconcile U.S. support for Israel to counterbalance Soviet influence in the Arab world with both foreign and domestic economic policies.
The full impact of the embargo, including high inflation and stagnation in oil importers, resulted from a complex set of factors beyond the proximate actions taken by the Arab members of OPEC. The declining leverage of the U.S. and European oil corporations (the “Seven Sistersâ€) that had hitherto stabilized the global oil market, the erosion of excess capacity of East Texas oil fields, and the recent decision to allow the U.S. dollar to float freely in the international exchange all played a role in exacerbating the crisis. Once the broader impact of these factors set in throughout the United States, it triggered new measures beyond the April and November 1973 efforts that focused on energy conservation and development of domestic energy sources. These measures included the creation of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, a national 55-mile-per-hour speed limit on U.S. highways, and later, President Gerald R. Ford’s administration’s imposition of fuel economy standards. It also prompted the creation of the International Energy Agency proposed by Kissinger.
1974
NO RACE—FUEL CRISIS
Oil Embargo, 1973–1974
During the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, Arab members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) imposed an embargo against the United States in retaliation for the U.S. decision to re-supply the Israeli military and to gain leverage in the post-war peace negotiations. Arab OPEC members also extended the embargo to other countries that supported Israel including the Netherlands, Portugal, and South Africa. The embargo both banned petroleum exports to the targeted nations and introduced cuts in oil production. Several years of negotiations between oil-producing nations and oil companies had already destabilized a decades-old pricing system, which exacerbated the embargo’s effects.
Cars wait in long lines during the gas shortage. (Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division, U.S. News & World Report Magazine Photograph Collection, Warren K. Leffler)
cars wait in long lines during the gas shortage. (Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division, U.S. News & World Report Magazine Photograph Collection, Warren K. Leffler)
The 1973 Oil Embargo acutely strained a U.S. economy that had grown increasingly dependent on foreign oil. The efforts of President Richard M. Nixon’s administration to end the embargo signaled a complex shift in the global financial balance of power to oil-producing states and triggered a slew of U.S. attempts to address the foreign policy challenges emanating from long-term dependence on foreign oil.
By 1973, OPEC had demanded that foreign oil corporations increase prices and cede greater shares of revenue to their local subsidiaries. In April, the Nixon administration announced a new energy strategy to boost domestic production to reduce U.S. vulnerability to oil imports and ease the strain of nationwide fuel shortages. That vulnerability would become overtly clear in the fall of that year.
The onset of the embargo contributed to an upward spiral in oil prices with global implications. The price of oil per barrel first doubled, then quadrupled, imposing skyrocketing costs on consumers and structural challenges to the stability of whole national economies. Since the embargo coincided with a devaluation of the dollar, a global recession seemed imminent. U.S. allies in Europe and Japan had stockpiled oil supplies, and thereby secured for themselves a short-term cushion, but the long-term possibility of high oil prices and recession precipitated a rift within the Atlantic Alliance. European nations and Japan found themselves in the uncomfortable position of needing U.S. assistance to secure energy sources, even as they sought to disassociate themselves from U.S. Middle East policy. The United States, which faced a growing dependence on oil consumption and dwindling domestic reserves, found itself more reliant on imported oil than ever before, having to negotiate an end to the embargo under harsh domestic economic circumstances that served to diminish its international leverage. To complicate matters, the embargo’s organizers linked its end to successful U.S. efforts to bring about peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors.
Partly in response to these developments, on November 7 the Nixon administration announced Project Independence to promote domestic energy independence. It also engaged in intensive diplomatic efforts among its allies, promoting a consumers’ union that would provide strategic depth and a consumers’ cartel to control oil pricing. Both of these efforts were only partially successful.
President Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger recognized the constraints inherent in peace talks to end the war that were coupled with negotiations with Arab OPEC members to end the embargo and increase production. But they also recognized the linkage between the issues in the minds of Arab leaders. The Nixon administration began parallel negotiations with key oil producers to end the embargo, and with Egypt, Syria, and Israel to arrange an Israeli pullout from the Sinai and the Golan Heights. Initial discussions between Kissinger and Arab leaders began in November 1973 and culminated with the First Egyptian-Israeli Disengagement Agreement on January 18, 1974. Though a finalized peace deal failed to materialize, the prospect of a negotiated end to hostilities between Israel and Syria proved sufficient to convince the relevant parties to lift the embargo in March 1974.
The embargo laid bare one of the foremost challenges confronting U.S. policy in the Middle East, that of balancing the contradictory demands of unflinching support for Israel and the preservation of close ties to the Arab oil-producing monarchies. The strains on U.S. bilateral relations with Saudi Arabia revealed the difficulty of reconciling those demands. The U.S. response to the events of 1973–1974 also clarified the need to reconcile U.S. support for Israel to counterbalance Soviet influence in the Arab world with both foreign and domestic economic policies.
The full impact of the embargo, including high inflation and stagnation in oil importers, resulted from a complex set of factors beyond the proximate actions taken by the Arab members of OPEC. The declining leverage of the U.S. and European oil corporations (the “Seven Sistersâ€) that had hitherto stabilized the global oil market, the erosion of excess capacity of East Texas oil fields, and the recent decision to allow the U.S. dollar to float freely in the international exchange all played a role in exacerbating the crisis. Once the broader impact of these factors set in throughout the United States, it triggered new measures beyond the April and November 1973 efforts that focused on energy conservation and development of domestic energy sources. These measures included the creation of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, a national 55-mile-per-hour speed limit on U.S. highways, and later, President Gerald R. Ford’s administration’s imposition of fuel economy standards. It also prompted the creation of the International Energy Agency proposed by Kissinger.
badassmav
Well-Known Member
I find it odd that only 50-55% of the entries finished the 1000's, while a whopping 70% of the entries finished the 2000. What percentage of our class do you think will finish this years 1000? I'm guessing 40%. Will you be one of the lucky 6?
Great reading buy the way on the 70's gas crunch. I was 10 years old, and remember my parents lining up for gas. If your license plate ended in an odd number, you could only get gas on M, W, F, Sun, Tue, etc. and vice versa for even numbered plates. There were lots of people bringing in Jerry cans, RV's, you name it, just to be sure they were covered on the off days. Then, they limited the amount of purchase to 10 gallons per customer, or something similar.
Great reading buy the way on the 70's gas crunch. I was 10 years old, and remember my parents lining up for gas. If your license plate ended in an odd number, you could only get gas on M, W, F, Sun, Tue, etc. and vice versa for even numbered plates. There were lots of people bringing in Jerry cans, RV's, you name it, just to be sure they were covered on the off days. Then, they limited the amount of purchase to 10 gallons per customer, or something similar.
My parents & the neighbors used to swap plates so they could get gas when they needed it vs what day it was.
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